Linear Programming and Zero-Sum Two-Person Undiscounted Semi-Markov Games

Abstract

In this paper, zero-sum two-person finite undiscounted (limiting average) semi-Markov games (SMGs) are considered. We prove that the solutions of the game when both players are restricted to semi-Markov strategies are solutions for the original game. In addition, we show that if one player fixes a stationary strategy, then the other player can restrict himself in solving an undiscounted semi-Markov decision process associated with that stationary strategy. The undiscounted SMGs are also studied when the transition probabilities and the transition times are controlled by a fixed player in all states. If such games are unichain, we prove that the value and optimal stationary strategies of the players can be obtained from an optimal solution of a linear programming algorithm. We propose a realistic and generalized traveling inspection model that suitably fits into the class of one player control undiscounted unichain semi-Markov games.