Linda Zagzebski's Virtues of the Mind

Abstract

Linda Zagzebski has an interesting project in this book. She wishes to develop an epistemological theory which is informed by work in virtue ethics. While a number of authors have presented epistemological theories which revolve around a notion of intellectual virtue, I believe that Zagzebski is right in thinking that many of these accounts, for better or worse, are not rooted in the kind of virtue ethic she favors. For example, Ernest Sosa's1 notion of intellectual virtue is, in large measure, reliabilist; what makes an intellectual trait a virtue, on his account, is explained in terms of its tendency to produce true beliefs (although the role of a coherent epistemic perspective is also included). But many virtue ethicists do not define the moral virtues in such instrumental terms. An epistemology which models itself on this second kind of view must take the notion of intellectual virtue as its centerpiece, explaining the nature of virtue in something other than instrumental terms, and explaining other epistemic notions in terms of the virtues. What marks Zagzebski's work as distinctive is this attempt to model an epistemological theory on just such a virtue ethic. Exciting as this is, I have a number of questions about the enterprise, both in overall conception and in its details. I'll try to raise a number of these points here. Let us start with Zagzebski's account of a (morally) right act: