Lincoln, Seward, and US Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era by Joseph A. Fry

Abstract

Reviewed by: Lincoln, Seward, and US Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era by Joseph A. Fry David J. Gerleman (bio) Lincoln, Seward, and US Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era. By Joseph A. Fry. (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2019. Pp. 248. $40.00 cloth) The mid-nineteenth century crackled with crisis as imperial expansionism, unification ‘questions,’ and massive civil upheavals churned the waters of international foreign relations. Yet the American Civil War has too often been left out of that discussion and viewed instead as an insular struggle for the nation’s self-identity. In his book, Lincoln, Seward, and US Foreign Relations in the Civil War Era, Joseph A. Fry, distinguished professor of history emeritus at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, examines the unusual partnership that developed between Abraham Lincoln and his Secretary of State William H. Seward and their struggles with global diplomacy. Although fierce rivals in 1860, the two morphed into close personal friends and formed a political odd-couple whose twin goals revolved around preservation of the Union and prevention of pro-Confederate foreign intervention. Both knew that any serious misstep could lead to disastrous consequences and bring about the recognition of Southern independence regardless of what federal armies achieved in the field. [End Page 510] Fry makes a diligent attempt to view the American Civil War from an international perspective and to provide a deeper understanding of the Lincoln administration’s foreign policy challenges. Despite Lincoln and Seward’s outward differences, including radically different upbringings, personality, and social status, Fry contends both adamantly believed that national territorial integrity and the restriction of slavery were key requirements for the advancement of U.S. power. Further cementing their bond was a shared belief in American exceptionalism as a nation that had to endure as “last best hope of earth” considering the triumph of repressive anti-democratic measures in post–1848 Europe. Fry argues that it was this synchronicity of views that enabled Lincoln and Seward to navigate the tricky channels of Civil War diplomacy with flexibility, imagination, and restraint while also laying the foundations for America’s later empire overseas. A persistent question is whether this book intends to be a comprehensive treatment of America’s entire global relations during the Civil War era or merely a restricted exploration of the inner workings of the Lincoln-Seward diplomatic partnership. Fry primarily focuses on entanglements with Britain and France, which is understandable considering their potential impact on the outcome of America’s war, but other parts of the world—such as Asia—are barely mentioned, a startling omission for a scholar possessing detailed knowledge of that region. Fry draws heavily on the works of Ronald C. White and Doris Kearns Goodwin, but surprisingly does not make use of any of Michael Burlingame’s significant body of work on Lincoln. Other awkward points include incongruous placement of Lincoln’s death within the narrative, a dearth of maps, and surprising non-inclusion of satirically informative diplomatic cartoons from sources such as Britain’s Punch magazine. The book’s purpose stated in the preface is as an “unapologetic synthesis” of other works intended for college classes and general readers. Both those audiences will find it informative, but Civil War specialists will find no new research or groundbreaking original arguments. Also lacking is the use of presidential papers from the Lincoln, [End Page 511] Johnson, and Grant Administrations aside from one citation from Roy P. Basler’s Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln. More lamentable is the absence of any internet resources or incorporation of online digital diplomatic documents from easily accessible repositories such as the Library of Congress. Such a deficiency makes the volume feel more dated than it otherwise merits. Worthy of praise is the bibliographic essay and thorough endnotes at the end of the volume which amply prove the author’s grasp of secondary sources, including many recently published works. Fry’s easy writing style and cogent interpretations will benefit anyone interested in American diplomacy. Discussion of how Union victory prevented the balkanization of North America and excluded slavery from the nation’s westward continental march is especially thought provoking. Fry’s assessment of the Lincoln...