Lincoln’s Wartime Incumbency Network: Vertical Trust, Informal Payments, and the U.S. Presidential Election of 1864

Abstract

Public choice interpretations of historical events represent a growing literature in economics. This particular study follows in, and builds upon, this tradition by examining, through the public choice lens, events leading up to die U.S. presidential election of 1864. We posit that die modern theory of bureaucracy, as described in Breton and Wintrobe [ 1982], perhaps best explains die way in which Abraham Lincoln’s subordinates assisted, sometimes even manipulating the gears of die federal (Union) government in doing so, in his re-election effort. That bureaucracy, which we refer to herein as Lincoln's wartime incumbency network, was based on a system of «vertical trust», and included an incentive structure wherein subordinates provided Lincoln with «informal services» related to his re-election in 1864, and were provided in return with «informal payments», which often consisted of ex ante/ex post promotions and/or nominations for other government positions.