Limits on Client Autonomy in Legal Ethics

Abstract

This Article examines legal ethics provisions that limit client autonomy and identifies the spectrum of reasons for which code drafters have circumscribed client autonomy. It concludes that, by failing to tailor limiting provisions to their justifications, the professional code drafters drafters have promulgated a series of flawed rules. Part I of this Article describes a variety of justifications for imposing limitations, ranging from the lawyer's superior decisionmaking expertise to independent societal interests that outweigh the client's interest in autonomy. Part II relates the existing rules that limit client autonomy to their justifications, demonstrating that at least some of the rules have been drafted poorly. Part III analyzes the ramifications of these drafting deficiencies. The purpose of this Article is not to second-guess the aims of the legal ethics codes. The Article accepts, as a given, the validity of the drafters' initial decisions to limit client freedoms and, often, to take a paternalistic posture. Its focus, instead, is on demonstrating the importance of rigor in code drafting, especially when the codes shift moral or tactical responsibility for decisions from clients to lawyers.