Limits on Authoritarian Imposition of Policy

Abstract

Does regime type affect policy outcomes? Do authoritarian regimes have greater policy discretion than democratic regimes? The empirical evidence is ambiguous. Using two cases of failed military populism in Ecuador, the author argues that two authoritarian characteristics—lack of participation in decision making and nonmobilization—frustrated implementation of import substitution policies. Ironically, groups expected to benefit most—industrialists and urban workers—provided the principal opposition. Although the regime needed their cooperation to implement policy, neither group had assurance that its interests were protected. Thus political alliances require more than an exchange of policies for support; regimes must make their commitments credible by permitting the participation in decision making and mobilization of groups whose cooperation is needed for policy implementation. This conclusion is supported by a comparison to Peru (where a military regime encountered similar obstacles) and Argentina (where a democratically elected military officer, Perón, was able to implement import substitution policies).