Limits of Generosity and Trust: The Naval Side of the Combined Munitions Assignment Board, 1942–1945

Abstract

Economic mobilisation and close collaboration were central to Allied victory over the Axis powers in the Second World War. At political and senior military levels, American and British staffs worked together to harness available resources, pursue a common strategy, and exchange vital information. Although virtually taken for granted in retrospect, provision of the vast quantities of war materials and munitions necessary for timely prosecution of military operations was little short of remarkable. The winning of total war on a global scale involved overwhelming material advantage. During the four war years, American shipyards and factories turned out some 87,620 large and small warships, 372,000 guns and 296,000 aircraft, at a cost of Us$183 billion. In contrast, over six years of war, Great Britain produced 4300 large and small warships, 132,100 guns, and 96,100 aircraft, while the Dominion of Canada manufactured 4043 small warships and landing craft, 42,966 guns and 16,418 aircraft.1 The United States clearly deserved Franklin Roosevelt's billing as the 'Arsenal of Democracy'. The industrial capacity in the United States that produced such impressive numbers was huge compared to most other countries at the time, but never remained unlimited. A world-wide war in several key theatres of operations and an American commitment to share a portion of its war production with Allied nations