Limits of authority of presiding judge as a head of court proceedings in the first instance court through criminal procedural legislation

Abstract

The article is devoted to limits of authority of presiding judge as a manager in the court of first instance through criminal procedural legislation. The scientific-legal analysis of the current normative-legal acts and scientific-theoretical sources on this issue is carried out. It is established that neither the law nor the legal doctrine defines the term “authority of the presiding judge in the trial at first instance”.According to the results of the study of doctrinal and normative sources, the author’s interpretation of the powers of the presiding judge in the court proceedings at first instance is formed under the proposition to understand the powers of the presiding judge, enshrined in the criminal procedure of the presiding officer city, city or city district court, which includes preparatory court proceedings, court proceedings and decisions and pronouncement of the judgment.The powers of the chairman of the text of the Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine were found to be too dispersed and the list was insufficient. The need to systematize and expand the list of powers of the presiding judge at first instance is emphasized. In particular, it is proposed to systematize the powers of the presiding judge in the trial at first instance by defining them in the Criminal Procedure Code as a separate article.It is proposed to give the presiding judge a set of supervisory powers regarding the active position of defense and to prescribe the presiding judge’s responsibility for the passive lawyer as part of the procedural status of the presiding judge in criminal proceedings. The feasibility of such innovations is illustrated by the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights.