Limiting diplomatic friction: Sweden, the United States and SKF's ball bearing exports to Eastern Europe, 1950–52

Abstract

This article deals with the US government's efforts to curb the Swedish ball bearing producer SKF's exports to the East early in the Cold War, 1950–1952, and interprets this process within the framework of hegemony theory. In doing this, the article makes use of previously unutilised US archival material. The period up to mid-1951 saw increasing US pressure upon Sweden and SKF to consent to US hegemony by abiding by the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom) embargo. To achieve its objectives US policymakers developed a flexible ‘carrot and stick’ approach, and the article adds considerable detail regarding the US government's handling of SKF. US tolerance and flexibility was dependent upon Swedish consent to American hegemony in Western Europe, which was received through the signing of the Stockholm agreement – a hegemonic apparatus through which Sweden's abidance by the embargo was handled – in mid-June 1951. A small amount of exports was accepted by Washington as long as the main US objective – to deny the Eastern Bloc strategic technology – was adhered to by SKF. The article also reveals the lack of policy coordination in the Swedish government, and the conflicts between the government and SKF regarding the responsibility for adhering to the embargo.