Limited Power-Sharing in a Personalized Regime: Xi Jinping’s Strategic Retreat from Local Politics

Abstract

ABSTRACT In an authoritarian regime, the ruler faces a fundamental dilemma whereby the concentration of power increases the likelihood of subordinates distrusting the ruler. This study examines how Xi Jinping in China addresses this dilemma by sharing access-to-power positions with his central subordinates. By analyzing the promotion patterns of provincial officials from 1992 to 2021, this paper identifies Xi’s attempts to personalize provincial leadership by prioritizing his personal connections over conventional promotion criteria when selecting provincial party secretaries and governors. To mitigate the elite’s distrust resulting from this consolidation, Xi granted the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) members influence over appointments for mid-ranking officials in provinces, such as provincial standing committee members. However, this power-sharing mechanism is limited as Xi Jinping grants these privileges exclusively to PSC members who have close ties with him, leaving those without such connections unable to cultivate patronage networks within provinces.