Limitations of the Ordinary-Crimes Approach to the International Crime of Rape: the Case of Uganda

Abstract

Abstract Not many states have effective national laws on prosecution of international crimes. Presently, of the 124 states parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute), less than half have specific national legislation incorporating international crimes. Some faith has been placed in the ordinary-crimes approach; the assumption being that states without effective laws on international crimes can prosecute on the basis of ordinary crimes. This article assesses the practicality of this approach with regard to the crime of rape in Uganda. Based on this assessment, the author draws a number of conclusions. First, that there are glaring gaps in the Ugandan definition of rape, making it impossible for it to be relied on. Secondly, although national courts have the option to interpret national laws with a view to aligning them with international law, the gaps salient in the definition of ordinary rape are too glaring; they cannot be remedied by way of interpretation without undermining the principle of legality. Thirdly, prosecuting the international crime of rape as an ordinary crime suggests that approaches applicable to the prosecution of ordinary rape will be invoked. Because these approaches were never intended to capture the reality of the international crime of rape, the ordinary-crimes approach remains illusory.