Lieutenant Colonel Karl Dolezhal’s Views on the Future of Military Operations of the Galician Army in the Dnieper Ukraine in July 1919

Abstract

In the study, the author analyzes the report of the Galician Army Lieutenant Colonel Karl Dolezhal to the military-political leadership of the WR of UPR, which was formulated on July 15, 1919. The report referred to the employment of the Galician Army after its abandoning the territories of Eastern Galicia when the Galician military forces in the Dnieper Ukraine had to fight with several opponents. The views of Karl Dolezhal clearly reflect the contemporary discussions between the Western Ukrainian political leadership and the military commanders on further armed struggle, in particular on the choice of the main military operation in the direction of Kyiv or Odessa. In his recommendations, Karl Dolezhal, as well as a significant part of the authors of the memoirs on the events of that time, was a supporter of a military campaign in the direction of Odessa. In his opinion, the deployment in the Northern Black Sea region would allow the army to recover, as winter in Kyiv region was much more severe. Also, in the views of the then politicians and military officers of the UPR, access to the Black Sea ports made it possible to replenish military supplies, in particular with the help of the Entente.However, in his recommendations, Karl Dolezhal did not take into account a number of important factors that influenced the Galician Army after the Zbruch transition, in particular the inevitable war with the Volunteer Army. The concentration of the main striking power in the Odessa direction would not have been as easy as the colonel had imagined. First of all, because Denikin was the first to seize the Northern Black Sea. The very chances of victory in the war against the Army of General Anton Denikin were small due to his support by the Entente. Thus, the White Guards had better material security and were much more numerous than the Ukrainian Armed Forces.In today’s armed confrontation with Russia, one should take into account the lesson given by this short episode of the First Ukrainian liberation movements of 1917–1921: when assessing the situation, one should consider all its possible components in the most unfavorable combination even if intuitively they would rather be avoided.