Abstract

There is a regulatory option for conscientious objection in health care that has yet to be systematically examined by ethicists and policymakers: granting a liberty to request exemption from prescribed work tasks without a companion guarantee that the request is accommodated. For the right-holder, the liberty’s value lies in the ability to seek exemption without duty-violation and a tangible prospect of reassignment. Arguing that such a liberty is too unreliable to qualify as a right to conscientious objection leads to the problem of consistently distinguishing its effects from those of a right to conscientious objection that is made conditional on an individual assessment of the objector’s motivation. These properties require that we distinguish the liberty to request exemption from more restrictive policy choices, and that we subject it to greater scrutiny in the wider moral discourse as a possible variant of a right to conscientious objection.

Full Text
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