Abstract
In this paper I offer a pragmatist response to Alasdair Cochrane’s recent claim that most nonhuman animals do not have an intrinsic interest in liberty. My argument is grounded in what Aaltola recently referred to as “anthropocentric paradigm” valuing practices, specifically, widespread public concern for animal pain and suffering. In making a case for animals having an intrinsic interest in liberty I focus, in pragmatic fashion, on practical and linguistic dimensions of the issue. By grounding the argument in ordinary valuing practices, I aim to show that even approaches that are supposedly antithetical to animal liberation afford theoretical scope for abolishing harsh confinement practices.
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