Liberties, Not Rights

Abstract

David Gauthier's Morals by Agreement is an ambitious attempt to understand morality as the outcome of a rational agreement among persons, each concerned to promote her own interest.1 In this paper, I will focus only on Gauthier's theory of the initial bargain ing position: specifically, his attempt to derive property rights from a moral principle called the Lockean proviso.2 I argue that the derivation fails, and that the true implications of the moral principles that Gauthier invokes are quite different. These princi ples imply that persons have extensive liberties to use physical materials, but relatively few rights against interference by others in this use. Since Robert Nozick's argument for an extensive system of property rights is similar to Gauthier's, I briefly argue that it likewise fails. I conclude that in order to defend property rights, Lockeans need to start from a moral foundation richer than those offered by Gauthier and Nozick.