Abstract
AbstractPeople often fail to make the choices that best satisfy their preferences. The design of the social environment inevitably makes some choices easier than others. According to Libertarian Paternalists, these facts justify governments nudging people towards better choices through changes to the so-called choice architecture. This is a form of means paternalism. However, the social environment affects not only people's choices or means, but also the preferences they adopt in the first place. Call this the problem of ‘preference architecture’. This article argues that preference architecture constitutes a fundamental challenge to the justificatory basis of Libertarian Paternalism. More generally, it explores when, if ever, government paternalism that influences preference formation can be justified. While Libertarian Paternalism cannot provide a satisfactory answer, the author defends a contractualist account of paternalism based on a notion of primary goods and democratic deliberation.
Highlights
It is often thought that government paternalism can only be justified, if at all, when it promotes the individual’s good, as defined by his or her own preferences
This approach offers a justifiable basis for paternalistic policies that are not perfectionist in character. This way, we can reconcile the fact that the social environment shapes our preferences with a deep-seated scepticism about government paternalism that disregards our own ideas of the good life
Among the most interesting, yet least discussed, aspects of Libertarian Paternalism is the argument concerning the inevitability of government intervention
Summary
Paternalism is conventionally understood as interfering with a person’s liberty or autonomy ‘for his own good’ (Dworkin 1972, 67). Libertarian Paternalists prefer nudges, but they do not rule out harder forms of paternalism when ‘strong empirical justifications, involving relevant costs and benefits, support a more aggressive approach’ (Sunstein 2014, 72) This suggests that it is not the softness, but rather the non-interference with people’s ends that gives the theory its libertarian credentials. If we accept the inevitability argument in conjunction with the welfarist argument, one might argue that the burden of proof is on those who reject influencing people’s choices in order to improve their welfare – as long as the latter is understood in a way that reflects people’s own ideas of what makes their lives go well
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