Abstract
Summary Theoretical treatments of corruption in the new political economy place bureaucrats who control public sector goods centre stage. Corrupt behaviour then involves the creation of new private property rights over such goods, and deregulation and privatization will then destroy the preconditions for corruption. Here, empirical material from South India is used in a political economy framework to show how such theories represent an arbitrary and highly ideologically filtered subset of relations of corruption. Alternatives are described in which the process of accumulation through market exchange, rather than the rent seeking of the bureaucrat, is centre stage. Further, under conditions where the purposes of corruption are not merely private bureaucratic gain but also bidding for political power, then the predictions of new political economy can be up‐ended and corruption can be seen to increase consequent to deregulation.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
