Liberalism’s disease: Civility above justice

Abstract

Liberal societies depend on wide adherence to norms of civility in the interactions of everyday life and in maintaining hierarchies of social structure. Norms of civility often are instrumental in appeals to reason and in the informal enforcement of social order. The virtue of civility fits well within the ideals of liberalism because it is grounded in beliefs about the mutual benefits of moderation, temperance, tolerance and respect. However, civility can be at odds with arguably more compelling virtues, particularly justice. Few of us would wish to coexist with others in a continued state of incivility, and the aim of this essay is not to dismiss the value and importance of civility to communication in everyday life. Rather, the essay explores a potentially dysfunctional aspect of civility, namely, the problem of using appeals to civility to silence dissenting communication and expression about fundamental questions of social justice. Liberalism is premised on a strong belief in the benefits of ‘equality of opportunity’ in all spheres of life, but not all liberals give primacy to social justice as a virtue that is essential to a good society. Civility is unquestionably useful, but there are compelling reasons to assume that when calls for civility stem from asymmetrical efforts to regulate communication, the likelihood of unjust outcomes is increased significantly. This condition is a pathological affliction that is familiar to actually existing liberalism, and it is the central concern of this essay.