Liberalism and the Communitarian Critique

Abstract

to quest for impartiality, not Rawls's particular version of concept. People act abstract selves when they make moral choices under constraints that rule out factors irrelevant to selection of principles of justice. Of course, idea of abstract could be used to support spurious claims to impartiality. Some have argued that Rawls smuggles arbitrary substantive conceptions of person into original position (see, e.g., Schaar, 1974, pp. 77-81). Since concept does not entail an Archimedean position of absolute impartiality, particular formulations of abstract must be subject to revision. Nevertheless, when seeking persons must assume constraints of an abstract self. An argument about principles of justice must, like jury, be sequestered from considerations favorable to interests of particular persons. Bias must constantly be removed in an unending search for more defensible principles. Some who are committed to may question concept of abstract self. We suggest, however, that distinctive constraints of an abstract are so important that theorists who try to avoid concept often interject it when they strive for impartiality. For example, James Fishkin believes that hypothetical constructs like original position are not required by liberal theorists, that principles of justice can be distilled from real social conditions. idea is to attempt so far possible to purge actual on-going society-rather than some imaginary counter-part-of bias and indoctrination (1985, p. 25). Yet, he thinks that refined motives must be brought to bear on existing situation. Refinement occurs when the motivation for choosing principles has been altered or filtered in interests of impartiality (Fishkin, 1985, p. 22). When motivations are thus refined, person adopts constraints of an abstract self. The distinction between abstract and living helps to delineate two concepts of individualism-sociological individualism This content downloaded from 207.46.13.73 on Thu, 11 Aug 2016 05:07:55 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms LIBERALISM AND THE COMMUNITARIAN CRITIQUE 645 and moral individualism. Sociological individualism is false view of living because it assumes that persons are not connected by intrinsic social bonds. This notion of individualism deserves attack of communitarians, for an empirical case against it has been confirmed in most of social sciences. Moreover, communitarians often point out that sociological individualism can lead to claim that authoritarian institutions are needed to produce order among warring individuals (Sandel, 1984, p. 7; Barber, 1984, pp. 109-12). Moral individualism, conception of persons on which idea of abstract is based, presupposes for moral choice that cannot be reduced to performance of given roles. It emphasizes that although people cannot escape social ties, they can critically evaluate shared understandings. Persons who seek impartial principles of justice cannot be totally constituted by their social (and natural) environment, and moral deliberation about justice is not possible if they can only recite prevailing prejudices. Although Rawls thinks that his idea of original position does not presuppose view of essential nature of self, Gutmann points out that his theory is incompatible with notion of radically situated (Gutmann, 1985, p. 313). Rawls emphasizes that people in original position regard moral personality. . . fundamental aspect of self (1971, p. 563). Such persons presume that may choose good and have sense of justice (Rawls, 1985, p. 244). Moreover, liberals are not alone in rejecting idea of radically situated self. The communitarian theorists that we examine do so well. For example, Sandel thinks is not completely defined by particular society. He refers to the of through reflection to participate in constitution of its identity (1982, p. 144). As selfinterpreting being, I am able to reflect on my history and in this sense to distance myself from it, but distance is always precarious and provisional (Sandel, 1982, p. 179). Another communitarian, Carole Pateman, is critical of idea of an abstract because, like Sandel, she does not distinguish it from living self. However, she also rejects radically situated self: Individuals are not completely submerged in their rules, meanings and oughts, but are also superior to them, and use them necessary basis from which they judge, choose and act, and create and change their social relationships (1986, p. 29). One of Rawls's critics thinks that those who have relations-centered conception of good, that is, communitarians, understand that persons have capacity for autonomous self-direction (Rodenwald, 1985, p. 240). Nevertheless, because communitarians emphasize living (encumbered) self, they have difficulty providing theoretical grounds for personal autonomy. In order to adopt constraints of an abstract self, person must be able to choose principles free moral agent. This content downloaded from 207.46.13.73 on Thu, 11 Aug 2016 05:07:55 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms 646 Robert B. Thigpen and Lyle A. Downing The moral who freely adopts constraints of an abstract is not Kantian transcendental ego, that ghostly entity conceived response to philosophical problems that are insoluble in mechanistic universe. Rather, idea of moral articulates undeniable experience of moral choice. Even deterministic psychologist like Milton Gordon admits that as individual human beings engaged in making decisions at virtually every moment . .. we must and do act though we had free (1978, p. 41). Of course, exercise of moral choice can either be politically suppressed or permitted. However, experience cannot be accounted for theoretically by concept of that is engulfed by social and natural determinants. If potentiality of persons for free moral choice is grounded in human nature, this provides foundation for idea of human rights. Deontological liberals recognize that, since persons cannot exercise essential capacities except under certain conditions, they have human to these conditions. For example, Alan Gewirth argues that agent (his formulation of concept of abstract self) would claim human to freedom and well-being (1978, pp. 59-63). In criticizing Gewirth, MacIntyre admits that rational must will possession of freedom and well-being, but he denies that presence of need establishes (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 66). Gewirth replies that although every need does not generate right, such an would claim human to freedom and well-being that are absolutely necessary for exercise of rational agency (Gewirth, 1985, p. 745). Dismissing idea of rational liberal invention, MacIntyre states that human rights have been claimed only in modern individualistic societies. Indeed, he finds no expression in any ancient or medieval language that corresponds to our term a right (1984, p. 66). We suggest, however, that, since language derives its meaning from context and function, different words could be used to claim human rights. Gewirth argues that rights-claims can sometimes be expressed demands that social institutions be established, when slaves revolt against their masters, or in other revolutionary situations (1985, p. 747). His idea of rational thus supports this political argument for to freedom and well-being: if community can provide these goods, then rational will accept legitimacy of political system to extent that it does provide them.