Liberalism and Individual Positive Freedom

Abstract

Among the various principles central to the tradition of liberalism is the claim that the state should protect individual liberty without dictating the goals and purposes espoused by free people. This tenet has been given expression by the general emphasis on negative liberty the claim that the liberty of a person is strictly a function of the restraints that the agent faces in the carrying out of her decisions (however the concept of a restraint is construed). The person-the complex set of functioning capacities and the forces that condition them-is not to be counted in the calculation of the freedom of that agent. It is a constant, so to speak. However, purveyors of the notion of positive liberty insist that the person and her capacity to formulate her desires, values, and goals is a crucial element in the calculation of the freedom of the agent. However, these writers have not responded to doubts from traditional liberals who are famously critical of the inclusion of any positive components in the concept of freedom. In this article I wish to respond by claiming that a certain notion of positive liberty can be defended against the classic liberal objections to the notion. The most challenging of these criticisms can be culled from Isaiah Berlin's Two Concepts of Liberty and remain forceful even after much discussion of them.' These objections are that the concept of positive