Abstract
In his important paper "Just Better Utilitarianism," Matti Häyry reminds his readers that liberal utilitarianism can offer a basis for moral and political choices in bioethics and thus could be helpful in decisionmaking.1 Although I agree with the general defense of Häyry's liberal utilitarianism, in this commentary, I urge Häyry to say more on who belongs to our moral community. I challenge Häyry's principle of actual or prospective existence. I also argue that Häyry should say more on human beings at the "margin of life" (such as fetuses and other mindless humans). I claim that debate over whether some form of utilitarianism is superior over other moral theories is not as important as answering the question underlying these issues: Who belongs to our moral community?
Highlights
In his important paper “Just Better Utilitarianism,” Matti Häyry reminds his readers that liberal utilitarianism can offer a basis for moral and political choices in bioethics and could be helpful in decisionmaking.[1]
Häyry’s liberal utilitarianism includes the following principle: “When the moral rightness of human activities is assessed, the imagined needs of non-existent beings who will never come into existence shall not be counted.”
Is one friendly suggestion for how to do that, which I call the revised principle of actual or prospective existence: When the moral rightness of human activities is assessed, the imagined needs of nonexistent beings who will never come into existence shall not be counted unless one has already made the decision to bring a person into existence
Summary
In his important paper “Just Better Utilitarianism,” Matti Häyry reminds his readers that liberal utilitarianism can offer a basis for moral and political choices in bioethics and could be helpful in decisionmaking.[1] I agree with the general defense of Häyry’s liberal utilitarianism, in this commentary, I urge Häyry to say more on who belongs to our moral community. I challenge Häyry’s principle of actual or prospective existence. I argue that Häyry should say more on human beings at the “margin of life” (such as fetuses). I claim that debate over whether some form of utilitarianism is superior over other moral theories is not as important as answering the question underlying these issues: Who belongs to our moral community?
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