Liberal and illiberal industrial policy in the EU: the political economy of building the EV battery value chain in Sweden and Hungary

Abstract

In the context of an increasingly ambitious European Union (EU) industrial policy and the transition to electromobility, the main objective of the article is to uncover the interaction between the supranational level and domestic policies through examining the buildup of the electric vehicle (EV) battery value chain in illiberal Hungary and liberal Sweden. The study analyses these diverse cases through the lenses of comparative political economy. How do European industrial policy objectives translate into national policies under widely different political conditions? How do the different translations impact on the original objectives of EU policy? Through using a structured-focused comparison, the paper argues that the building of the EV battery industry implies the entrenchment of existing models of capitalism in both cases. Liberal democracy is only compatible with the coordinated market economy model of Sweden, while in Hungary the illiberal regime and the dependent market economy model reinforce one another in face of growing public recognition of the disadvantages of dependency—misallocation of resources, environmental damage, and limits to upgrading. EU strategic objectives are served only by the Swedish model, while the Hungarian model leads to deepening institutional cleavages within the EU and implies growing dependence on Russia and China.