Abstract
We model bankruptcy problems under uncertainty under the assumption that there are several possible states of nature, each of which is identified with a different bankruptcy problem. For this multi-dimensional extension of classic bankruptcy problems, we consider situations in which agents exhibit at the same time additive preferences and leximin preferences on their possible results. We propose division rules which combine different rationality principles and guarantee efficiency with respect to leximin preferences.
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