Abstract
Pascal’s wager is one of the most influential arguments in philosophy and decision theory. This paper reformulates Pascal’s wager in terms of two-outcome finite payoffs (one before death and one after death). The proposed reformulation accentuates the lexicographic nature of decision maker’s preferences. Lexicographic preferences violate the continuity axiom—a standard assumption of many theories of decision making under risk and uncertainty. Since Pascal’s wager assumes lexicographic (i.e., discontinuous) preferences, it is appropriate to represent the latter with lexicographic utility and not conventional expected utility theory.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callMore From: The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
