Abstract
Abstract Lewis is a systematic philosopher. He defends his views in ethics by appeal to the principles that underlie his views in logic, epistemology, and metaphysics. He is an empiricist both about meaning and knowledge. He believes that judgments about objective states of affairs in the world are ‘non-terminating judgments’. They must eventually be explained by reference to ‘terminating judgments’ that are to be understood as predictions of possible experience. The relevant experience consists in apprehensions of what is given in experience. Apprehensions of the given are purely ‘expressive’; they do not constitute knowledge, because they are not subject to any possible error (AKV 183–4). Statements about them can be false only if one lies about them. They cannot be false because one honestly mis-describes them.
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