Levinas i Husserl: transcendentalna intersubiektywność

Abstract

This article is a comparison of the concept of Other in works of Levinas with transcendental intersubjectivity in Husserl’s works. In both of these philosophies relations between subjects have a significant role in the identification of the transcendental basis. In works of both Levinas and Husserl the contact with the Other not only opens us to transcendence, but also becomes a necessary condition of objective reality. Only through transcendental intersubjectivity an object is effectively constituted. This means that my individual intent includes a priori a reference to transcendental intersubjectivity as a transcendental area of constitution. This shows that not only the subjectivity has a time a priori, but developed subjective a priori corresponds with a priori genetic constitution which is based on the first one. Relation with Other is a new dimension of consciousness to which the absolute is available. We learn about this extraordinary relation through carrying it out. This is why the Absolute can happen only through I.