Levinas and the parent–child relation: A Merleau-Pontyian critique of applying Levinas's thought to developmental psychology.

Abstract

Central to Emmanuel Levinas's philosophical account of ethics and intersubjectivity is the parent–child relation. Throughout his major texts, paternity, maternity, and education all function as critical motifs that Levinas utilizes to claim that the subject is primordially oriented by a radical passivity and asymmetrical ethical obligation to the other. Further, several scholars, including Claude Lefort, Brian Vandenberg, Diane Perpich, and Joel Krueger, have highlighted Levinas's insights in relation to child development; however, I argue that they have not adequately accounted for the radicality of Levinas's view of original passivity as the essential ground of subjectivity. After explaining Levinas's account of radical passivity in the parent–child relation, I then turn to recent research in child development to evaluate Levinas's view. In light of the current research, I suggest that Merleau-Ponty's account of the parent–child relation not only complements Levinas's work, but it is also essential for ...