Abstract

The contentious ‘ethical turn’ in continental philosophy motivates this project. Emmanuel Levinas is among the leaders of this movement to draw renewed attention to ethics in the continental tradition. Levinas describes the transcendence that transpires in the self-Other encounter as the source of ethical obligation. However, given Friedrich Nietzsche’s ethical critique, his followers view the category of transcendence with suspicion. They think it presupposes an ontology of unchanging being. Since Nietzsche and his disciples reject ontologies of unchanging being, preferring immanence instead, they think that transcendence inevitably appeals to some imaginary world beyond the one we inhabit. Consequently, they view all philosophers of transcendence as escapist. To assess whether Levinas’ philosophical project is viable, I draw from Nietzsche’s work to mount a Nietzschean critique of Levinas. I subsequently consider a Levinasian reply to the Nietzschean critique, arguing that Levinas’ transcendence provides a compelling alternative to a Nietzschean ethics of immanence.

Highlights

  • Emmanuel Levinas’ thought occupies a place of special significance in the 20th century; he is responsible for what many call the ‘ethical turn’ in continental philosophy

  • While Part Two of this project ended with the formulation of a Nietzschean critique of Levinas, Part Three constructs a Levinasian reply to this critique

  • The Levinasian reply charges Nietzsche with misinterpreting Judaism primarily because he does not conceive of a transcendence that is compatible with immanence

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Summary

INTRODUCTION

While Part Two of this project ended with the formulation of a Nietzschean critique of Levinas, Part Three constructs a Levinasian reply to this critique. Part Three is structured so as to contrapuntally address each part of the Nietzschean critique This begins with Levinas’ dismissal, like Nietzsche’s, of the ontology of unchanging being. Levinas’ transcendence is not grounded on the notion of an unchanging essence as the Nietzschean critique charges. While a Levinasian might think Nietzsche’s attempts to affirm life as he does do not succeed, this does not amount to a Levinasian denial of life Instead, this analysis underscores the importance of striving for ongoing existence in the service of the Other. Levinas’ assessment of Judaism is related to the values ‘good’ and ‘evil’ that he identifies These values are shown to be completely different from the ‘good’ and ‘evil’ value dichotomy that Nietzsche describes. The Levinasian reply charges Nietzsche with misinterpreting Judaism primarily because he does not conceive of a transcendence that is compatible with immanence. Part Three concludes with a summative conjunction of all the points from the Levinasian replies to the Nietzschean critique

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF LEVINAS’ PHILOSOPHY
IS ONTOLOGY FUNDAMENTAL?
THE SELF-OTHER ENCOUNTER
TRANSCENDENCE FROM THE ONTOLOGY OF UNCHANGING BEING
THE ETHICS OF IMMANENCE
THE VALUE OF SUFFERING FOR NIETZSCHE
NIETZSCHE ON THE VALUES OF JUDAISM
A NIETZSCHEAN CRITIQUE OF LEVINAS
TRANSCENDENCE WITHOUT UNCHANGING BEING
IMMANENCE AND THE RESPONSIBLE BODY
THE VALUE OF SUFFERING FOR LEVINAS
GOOD, EVIL, AND JUDAISM
A NIETZSCHEAN CRITIQUE
CONCLUSION
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