Abstract
ABSTRACT This article aspires to make two original contributions to the vast literature on Hobbes’s account of the nature and person of the commonwealth: (1) I provide the first systematic analysis of his changing conception of ‘person’; and (2) use it to show that those who claim that the Hobbesian commonwealth is created by personation by fiction misconstrue his theory of the state. Whereas Elements/De Cive advance a metaphysics-based distinction between individuals (‘natural persons’) and corporations (‘civil persons’), from Leviathan onwards Hobbes contrasts individuals acting in their own name (‘natural persons’) with representatives (‘artificial persons’). These changes notwithstanding, Hobbes retains the same corporate conception of the state throughout. On the prevailing ‘fictionalist’ interpretation, the sovereign brings the commonwealth into existence by representing it. I argue, rather, that as an incorporation of natural persons, the commonwealth becomes one person through the authorized (i.e. non-fictitious) representation of each constituent member singly by one common representative (‘the sovereign’).
Highlights
The question of what kind of person the Hobbesian state is has long troubled commentators
New to Leviathan is an account of state-formation and state personality cashed out in terms of representation of, and authorization by, each subject
I conclude that incorporations can, paradoxically, be either representatives or natural-C persons, depending on whether they act in their own name or not
Summary
The question of what kind of person the Hobbesian state is has long troubled commentators. It fails to appreciate that personation occurs at two levels: the sovereign represents each individual citizen, turning the multitude into one person (‘a commonwealth’), and he bears the person of the commonwealth formed These two instances of personation, I argue, are different in kind, and only the second relation of representation can be said to be fictional. Runciman, ‘The Concept of the State’, 36; Vieira, The Elements of Representation, 170–80; Brito Vieira, ‘Making Up and Making Real’; Newey, Hobbes’s Leviathan, 178; Skinner, From Humanism to Hobbes, 359–60 Other disagreements in their readings of Hobbes notwithstanding, all scholars here associated with the fictionalist reading concur that the commonwealth (i.e. the people as one person) comes into being by being represented as such by the sovereign – i.e. through personation by fiction. To grasp Hobbes’s theory of the state, I conclude, we best turn to texts other than the English Leviathan
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
