Abstract
Abstract Analytic semantics got its start when Frege pointed out differences in cognitive content between sentences that in some good sense “say the same.” Frege put cognitive content (in the form of sense) at the heart of semantic content. Most prefer nowadays to see cognitive contents as generated by semantic contents in context; a sentence’s cognitive significance is an aspect rather of the information imparted by its use. This chapter argues for a particular version of this idea. Semantic contents generate cognitive contents by operating levers in a larger piece of machinery, involving also the presupposition P one is leaning on and the subject matter M under discussion. A sentence’s cognitive content is what its literal-content-restricted-to-P-worlds says about M. It’s by triggering different presuppositions and/or speaking to different subject matters that coreferential names make their distinctive mark on a sentence’s felt information value.
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