Abstract
In this paper, we develop a novel response to counterfactual scepticism, the thesis that most ordinary counterfactual claims are false. In the process we aim to shed light on the relationship between debates in the philosophy of science and debates concerning the semantics and pragmatics of counterfactuals. We argue that science is concerned with many domains of inquiry, each with its own characteristic entities and regularities; moreover, statements of scientific law often include an implicit ceteris paribus clause that restricts the scope of the associated regularity to circumstances that are ‘fitting’ to the domain in question. This observation reveals a way of responding to scepticism while, at the same time, doing justice both to the role of counterfactuals in science and to the complexities inherent in ordinary counterfactual discourse and reasoning.
Highlights
Counterfactual scepticism, the thesis that most counterfactuals are false, has received a fair amount of attention recently
We present a response to counterfactual scepticism
We identify a general way of conceiving cp laws, that is independently attractive (3.1) and supports our proposed response to counterfactual scepticism (3.2)
Summary
One prominent defender of counterfactual scepticism is Alan Hájek. The following line of argument is substantially Hájek’s (Unpublished manuscript). Ordinary speakers are inclined to think that 1a is true (at least on the understanding that the glass is fragile, and it would drop from a sufficient height onto a hard floor) Consider another example from biology (concerning sexually reproducing species that are genetically diploid):. Since coin tossing is recognised as chancy, 4a rings false (the coin’s landing heads is just one of the possible outcomes) while 4b rings true (it might land tails!). In the coin-toss case, we might think of the chanciness as arising from treating the antecedent as picking out a class of tosses, where these tosses differ along parameters like momentum, velocity, etc Hájek argues that once we recognise this about coin tosses we should recognise that nearly every counterfactual scenario is chancy, either because the relevant process is not deterministic, or because the relevant antecedents are unspecific, in Hájek’s sense. This, combined with the claim that whenever a might-not-counterfactual is true the corresponding would-counterfactual is false, leads Hájek to claim that most counterfactuals are false.
Sign-in/Register to view highlights & summary Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
