Abstract
ABSTRACTAn institutional perspective on nuclear deterrence cooperation within alliances has the potential to fundamentally reorient how we think about analyzing nuclear and deterrence decision-making between nuclear patrons and non-nuclear clients. It comes at a time when the presidency of Donald Trump is sure to test many of the core claims and assumptions in security studies, especially relating to bargaining and credibility within alliances. This article surveys questions that will be core to the research agenda involving alliance institutions and nuclear weapons during the Trump presidency and beyond.
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