Abstract
At the end of the Third Anglo-Afghan War, the British government in the metropole and the British-led Indian government found themselves at odds in their interpretation of the political situation in Afghanistan, leading them to pursue different policies towards this difficult interlocutor. Heather Campbell analyses the primary sources documenting the difficulties of this decision-making process, and suggests that a sound knowledge of history may be a useful foundation for policy-makers seeking to shape the future of the UK's relationship with Afghanistan.
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