Abstract
ABSTRACT This paper assesses deterrence efforts against the use of chemical weapons in Syria through the framework of rational deterrence theory (RDT). Deterrence succeeds and fails over stages and across time. In Syria, periodic deterrence breakdowns were linked to insufficient (or weakening) US commitment and resolve, which undermined US credibility. More broadly, the Syria case demonstrates the continued relevance of RDT, as well as the difficulties associated with establishing – and maintaining – successful deterrence. Policymakers must approach coercive diplomacy systematically, specifying the purpose of their strategy and weighing the goals of deterrence against alternative and additional political and/or military considerations.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
