Les externalités des systèmes de paiement : questions pour l'Europe

Abstract

Externalities in payment systems : issues for Europe The fast growing volume of financial and commercial transactions settled through large value payment systems has raised supervisory concerns. The article focuses on the externalities in payment systems and the appropriate role of the Central Bank in preserving the stability of the financial system. A conceptual framework is developed to analyse some key features of the main settlement systems. In net settlement, participants send payment messages throughout the day but only settle their net positions at the end of the day. The major risk is that a failure to settle by one bank may lead to settlement failures of others due to unexpected liquidity shortfalls and, thus, may trigger a systemic crisis. To prevent such a systemic crisis, the Central Bank may feel compelled to support the failing participant and will then become effectively the implicit guarantor of the system. To avoid their exposure in the payment system, Central Banks have been implementing risk reduction policies. A rigorous way of eliminating credit exposure is designing a gross settlement system without daylight exposures. But banks need then collateral or reserves before making payments. A lack of liquid funds could lead to settlement delays and, even worse, to a gridlock of the system, a new externality. Finally, the implications of payment systems for banking supervision and monetary policy are examined against the background of the role of a prospective European Central Bank. appropriate role of the Central Bank in preserving the stability of the financial system. A conceptual framework is developed to analyse some key features of the main settlement systems. In net settlement, participants send payment messages throughout the day but only settle their net positions at the end of the day. The major risk is that a failure to settle by one bank may lead to settlement failures of others due to unexpected liquidity shortfalls and, thus, may trigger a systemic crisis. To prevent such a systemic crisis, the Central Bank may feel compelled to support the failing participant and will then become effectively the implicit guarantor of the system. To avoid their exposure in the payment system, Central Banks have been implementing risk reduction policies. A rigorous way of eliminating credit exposure is designing a gross settlement system without daylight exposures. But banks need then collateral or reserves before making payments. A lack of liquid funds could lead to settlement delays and, even worse, to a gridlock of the system, a new externality. Finally, the implications of payment systems for banking supervision and monetary policy are examined against the background of the role of a prospective European Central Bank.