Les aléas de la stratégie de Napoléon sur mer

Abstract

The risks of Napoleon's maritime strategy ; Evaluating Napoleon’s relations with his navy and his maritiume strategy is like trying to shine light into a black hole. Only the defeats have gone down into history - Aboukir, Trafalgar - the underside, as it were, of the glories of the Napoleonic era. Yet in exile on St. Helena Napoleon, with some justification, declared himself satisfied with his record at sea. This article seeks to explain this apparent paradox. On assuming power, Napoleon inherited a French navy crippled by six years of war and blockade. He got to grips with making improvements quite effectively, but realised that he would need ten years of peace to fashion a fleet capable of challenging Britain’s Royal Navy with any prospect of suc¬ cess. The ending of the Peace of Amiens (1803) left France virtually disarmed at sea, certainly compared with the protection afforded Britain by its insular position and the ‘wooden walls’ of her fleet. To escape this strategic impasse, Napoleon decided to attempt an invasion of Britain. He based his plan on the assembly of a large fleet of shallow-draught barges to project the Grand Army, 150,000 soldiers, across the Channel. But the plan became delayed. And the more time passed, the greater the complications that emerged, and the clearer became the need for an accompanying sea-going fleet. In 1805 Napoleon attempted a large-scale manoeuvre aimed at concentrating the squadrons of the French fleet in the rear of the British - in the West Indies - before bringing them unexpectedly and suddenly back into Channel waters to cover the passage of the Grand Army to England. The plan failed, but it resulted in the Battle of Trafalgar, which ought never to have taken place. Napoleon, who at first sought to deny the scale of that defeat, did not give up on the French navy. On the contrary, he had it rebuilt once again and raised to the level of the fleet in 1789. He hoped that Britain would lower its guard, to enable him at some point to deliver her a mortal blow. Thus, contrary to what is often argued, Napoleon did understand the mysteries of naval strategy. He realised that a full-scale naval recovery could not be achieved in wartime, whilst Britain retained its mastery of the waves. Yet, and to his credit, he persevered.