Leo Strauss, Max Weber, and the Scientific Study of Politics (review)

Abstract

Nasser Behnegar, Leo Strauss, Max Weber, and the Scientific Study of Politics. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005, 216 pp. First published in 2003, Leo Strauss, Max Weber, and the Scientific Study of Politics has now been released in paperback. The title is somewhat misleading, inasmuch as Weber is only invoked in connection with Strauss' critique of social science. The book's stated objective is to show that 'Leo Strauss is a friend, perhaps an indispensable friend, of the scientific study of politics' (1). Relativism above all galvanized Strauss' belief that returning to classical political philosophy is 'a necessary step in achieving clarity about preferences of any kind' (3). Thus Part I assesses the viability of contemporary alternatives to his conception of a genuine science of politics. The conclusion is announced at the onset: the history of positivism is largely one of 'social science's dissatisfaction with its own achievements' (9). In this vein, the unraveling of Comte's progressive expectations with the advent of the First World War and the ascent of mass democracy, and their ultimate disappointment at the hands of behaviourist and rational choice paradigms, is chronicled. And this lamentable process, it is argued, culminates in political science's steadfast refutation of universally valid moral laws. According to Strauss, however, natural right is a perennial human need; it alone enables judgments about injustice. Hence the rejection of natural law occasions nihilism. But he warns there is no guarantee this repudiation is unwarranted and, therefore, that we must not 'embrace natural right in a spirit of fanatical obscurantism' (59). Rather, deliverance from our present-day sense of despair requires an acute appreciation of the fact that 'only the full awareness of our own perplexity can lead to the realization of the possibilities that remain open to us' (61). The rest of the book is devoted to Strauss' critique of positivism. The demise of natural right, he avers, occurred with the triumph of historicism on the one hand and a fact/value distinction on the other. Part II concentrates on the latter and, for this reason, deals with his chapter on Weber in Natural Right and History because of its 'thematic treatment' of this issue (5). For Strauss, reading Weber is vital to a full understanding of the modern condition, insofar as the idea of irreconcilable value conflicts gives rise to philistine conformism which, in conjunction with an untenable commitment to value-neutrality that vitiates the ascendancy of ultimate principles, undermines moral concerns. This nihilistic Weltanschauung has its origins in the theory of natural causality behind his model of science and allied notion of disenchantment. What is more, it discloses his opinion that conflict is a necessary condition for morality and, it follows, his 'preference for the tragic life' (114). All told, Weber hauntingly illuminates the abiding and seemingly insoluble tension between philosophy and revelation, between human and divine guidance. Strauss hopes that openness to the prospect of faith will put an end to this stand-off and cultivate earnest moral sensitivity. …