Leniency in anti-corruption law: Accountability in accordance with the backbone functions of State actors

Abstract

This paper sets out to discuss the main repercussions of the leniency agreements jointly celebrated by the Comptroller-General’s Office (CGU) and the Attorney-General’s Office (AGU), pursuant to Federal Law no. 12,846/13, on the actions of other Brazilian authorities responsible for fighting corruption, in the light of theoretical propositions regarding accountability. Taking the legal literature as starting point, it was found that such settlements can be classified as having the status of discretionary administrative acts, and it is relevant to establish the potential and limitations that this status entails. Considering the need in democratic systems for horizontal control mechanisms, managed by State agencies, this article then sought, on the basis of the theory that provides for the respective backbone functions, to delimit the corresponding fields of action, placing each organ correctly within the leniency system. The final considerations stress the need for harmonious, non-invasive and coordinated exercise of powers, on the basis of their legal functions and within the boundaries for their exercis