Lengthening Political Shadows

Abstract

The after-dinner remarks of the Army chief of staff to the American Legion in Washington on February 3 revealed the perspective of the American chiefs of staff as 1944 began. Optimistic that the end of the war in Europe would occur by the fall, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) became concerned as the year lengthened that victory in Europe might blunt the commitment of the American people to see the Pacific war through to the unconditional surrender of Japan. This preoccupation, and other political considerations such as growing awareness of the fading luster of China’s great power status and the moral and political lure of the Philippines as a strategic objective, cast an intricate political shadow over Pacific strategy in 1944. By the year’s end, however, following the wartime conference of FDR and Churchill at Quebec, the recall of General Stilwell from China, and recognition by the JCS of FDR’s increasing disillusionment with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the definition of that shadow became more distinct. The JCS found themselves able to devote their full efforts to the accomplishment of what they viewed as the one remaining clear national objective in the Pacific: securing the speedy unconditional surrender of Japan with a strategy that would sustain the commitment of the home front.2