Abstract
Europe’s financial architecture has long been criticized as fragmented, notably because its two main multilateral public banks, the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, have increasingly engaged in lending overlap. This overlap, it is assumed, creates inefficiencies and duplications, undermining the banks’ fulfilment of their missions. However, little is known about this overlap and its consequences. This article comparatively assesses the lending policy of both banks, while focusing on this overlap. It explains how and why bank lending policies initially led to uncoordinated lending overlap, but then shifted, ultimately moving towards a greater coordination of continued lending overlap.
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