Abstract
Freedom – both to choose our actions, and from obligation – features prominently in western conceptualizations of leisure. As such, freedom is the subject of considerable scholarly dialogue in the leisure studies context. While these discussions provide considerable value, they presuppose an important basic requirement: that free will is possible. This assumption is far from established fact however, and in this essay I examine the implications of leisure’s reliance on the possibility of free will. Specifically I argue that this type of leisure can only exist if we adopt a libertarian view of free will, discuss what this entails, address the consequences of other interpretations of free will, and provide some implications for future work in leisure studies.
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