Abstract
In this paper we investigate the outcome of second-price sealed-bid sequential auctions where players face delay costs if they decide to stay for the subsequent rounds. We analyze two distinct models of delay costs. First, as in the literature on auctions with entry, we consider the case where agents have to decide to stay for the next round (and consequently incur delay costs) before seeing thcir valuations for the good. In this context, and considering an arbitrary number of stochastically equivalent (non-identical) objects, we are able to reject Weber's (1983) claim that ex-ante expected prices are constant, for any particular distribution. Second, we study the alternative model where agents decide to stay or not for the subsequent round after seeing their valuations for the good. For a twoperiod model, we find an equilibrium with a screening level such that only bidders with values bigger than that decide to stay for the last period. We also provide an example where prices are decreasing.
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