Leibniz's Account of Error

Abstract

In the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz writes, 'Our perceptions are always true, it is our judgments that come from ourselves that deceive us' (section 14). Leroy Loemker in his 'Leibniz's Doctrine of Ideas' criticizes this account of error. His main worry can be presented in the form of the following syllogistic argument, which he derives from Leibniz's doctrine of ideas: (a) There cannot be a false perception; (b) All judgments are perceptions; and therefore (c) There cannot be a false judgment. However, in this paper I argue that Leibniz can distinguish between a perception and a judgment in their semantic aspect. The sense in which a perception turns out to be false (or true) for Leibniz is different from the sense in which a judgment turns out to be false (or true). This is because, while a perception, understood in Leibniz's terms, lacks truth-conditions, a judgment, in being representational, has such conditions. Thus while a perception remains true always, a judgment can be false. Pointing to the equivocal use of 'false' in (a) and (c) above, I conclude that (c) does not follow from (a) and (b).