Leibniz, Pufendorf, and the Possibility of Moral Self-Governance

Abstract

In his On the Duties of Man and Citizen, seventeenth century natural law theorist Samuel Pufendorf argues that the source of obligation lies in ‘the command of a superior’. This so-called ‘voluntarist’ position was famously criticized by the ‘rationalist’ Gottfried Leibniz. However, I wish to highlight several neglected aspects of the debate. Leibniz implicitly proposes a solution to a central moral problem: how one can be obligated voluntarily. His answer reflects a sort of motivational internalism, whereby the ideas of justice provide some motive cause of action, and virtue provides the rest. In this way, the agent acts voluntarily by making the principles of justice the principles of her action. Secondly, I show how this argument for the principles depends implicitly on his ‘science of right’, established in his earliest writings on jurisprudence. These principles are constituent of the nature of rational substance. It then becomes clear that Leibniz had long developed a foundation for self-governance, similar to Kantian autonomy, consisting in the agent's internal moral power to act (jus) and moral necessity to act (obligation). These points are exposed through a close reading of Leibniz's criticisms of Pufendorf on the end, object and efficient cause of natural law.