Abstract
The question has often been raised (and a negative answer has sometimes been given)1 of whether or not Leibniz took the relation of compossibility to be an equivalence relation, or — more neutrally put — whether or not his logical calculi and his metaphysical system require that the relation of compossibility be reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. The negative answer is indeed correct, provided we take the relata of that relation to be “incomplete” concepts (or else states of affairs, or propositions, which are themselves “incomplete” or mutually “independent”). But an affirmative answer is also correct, provided we take the relata of that relation to be complete individual concepts, and provided each of the constituents of any given possible world w (think of w as a maximally consistent set of mutually compossible complete concepts) is taken to “mirror”, to be “mirrored” by, and to be connected with, every other constituent of w.
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