Leibniz’ Aristotelian Philosophy of Nature

Abstract

I shall show now how Leibniz’ conception of motion, as it came to be expressed in his final controversy with Newtonian absolutism, is founded on his aristotelian ontology of actuality. The main difference between his view and Aristotle’s stems from Leibniz’ view of inertial motion as a real change in the substance’s qualities, and this view he based on his theory of attributes. He argued that relations are not extrinsic but rather intrinsic and so are real attributes of the substance. But this he could maintain only by presupposing that essence is not separate or separable from attributes. This view of essence is the basis of his principle of the identity of indiscernibles and of his ensuing rejection of space and time as real or separate entities. So he is not a relativist in the sense that he rejected the reality of motion. On the contrary, he was on this point a complete absolutist, and the deep difference between his and Newton’s views springs from his interpretation of absolute motion, not from any dispute about its existence. In his interpretation of absolute motion he supplied the absent part in Aristotle’s theory of natural motion which Aristotle could not formulate. Here, Leibniz’ success depended on his ability to formulate explicitly the view of essence which lay implicit in Aristotle’s revolt against Plato but which Aristotle did not explicate.1