Legitimacy without the Duty to Obey

Abstract

Philosophy & Public AffairsVolume 38, Issue 3 p. 215-239 Legitimacy without the Duty to Obey ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM Harvard UniversitySearch for more papers by this author ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM Harvard UniversitySearch for more papers by this author First published: 14 July 2010 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1088-4963.2010.01186.xCitations: 33 Versions of this article were given at the University of Bern, Switzerland, the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, UC Berkeley School of Law, Yale Law School, Washington and Lee University School of Law, and, initially, as the Gross Memorial Lecture at the University of Toronto Faculty of Law in 2001. I am grateful for the helpful comments of Bruce Ackerman, Michael Blake, Cory Brettschneider, Allen Buchanan, David Estlund, Alon Harel, Frances Kamm, Erin Kelly, Christopher Kutz, Daniel Markovits, Lukas Meyer, Arthur Ripstein, Mathias Risse, Frederick Schauer, Scott Shapiro, Alan Strudler, Dennis Thompson, Alec Walen, Bradley Wendel, Alan Wertheimer, and the Editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs. Support has been provided by the Edmond J. Safra Foundation Center for Ethics and the Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and Innovation at Harvard University. Read the full textAboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Citing Literature Volume38, Issue3Summer 2010Pages 215-239 RelatedInformation