Legislators’ pathway to power in Ghana: intra-party competition, clientelism and legislator – constituents’ relationship

Abstract

ABSTRACT An important quality of representative democracy is the strength of the linkage between citizens and the state. To provide a strong incentive for this relationship, Ghanaian legislators are elected on First-Past-The-Post system which in principle should foster close links between legislators and their constituents. In contrast to this expectation, there is an observed disconnect between the country’s legislators and their constituents. This paper investigates why Ghana’s electoral system is producing a starkly different outcome and which explanations could account for the gap between the country's representatives and the represented. Previous studies have not assessed patron–client networks mediating legislators’ pathway to power in Ghana and how it complicates the expected effects of electoral institutions. The paper argues that the relationship between legislators and their constituents in Ghana is mediated by the strong presence of clientelistic networks in intra-party primaries that tamper with the constraining effects of formal electoral rules.