Legislative veto players and human rights treaty signature timing

Abstract

ABSTRACT This paper investigates the relationship between domestic legislative veto players and human rights treaty commitment. While research connects legislative veto players with ratification delays, I argue that legislative veto players also shape the timing of nonbinding treaty signature. Confronted with the possibility of ratification delay or rejection, executives in states requiring legislative approval for ratification sign treaties earlier as signature does not require the legislature. The results of quantitative analyses strongly support the argument. Examining the treaty signature timing of four core UN human rights treaties (ICCPR, CAT, CEDAW, and CRC), I find an overall significant and positive relationship between the requirement of legislatures to approve ratification and earlier treaty signature timing. Executives are responding to legislative veto player delays by speeding up treaty signing. This article contributes to the study of international law and domestic politics by further connecting ratification approval processes to commitment timing.