Abstract
AbstractResearch on transparency in the EU and at the European Parliament, in particular, has extensively examined the adoption and implementation of transparency initiatives as well as the conditions under which interest groups have access to and influence on EU policy‐making. However, the question of whether Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are transparent regarding their interactions with interest group representatives has been overlooked by the literature. This study addresses the question of the conditions under which MEPs are more likely to provide information about their meetings with interest groups. The study engages with institutional theory by emphasizing that formal and informal rules incentivize MEPs' behaviour. Drawing on a dataset on MEPs' reports on their meetings with interest group representatives, the study demonstrates that procedural rules, party's position on the cultural dimension and the national corruption tradition affect legislators' propensity to disclose information about their meetings with interest groups.
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